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COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM
The remedy used to effect reinstatement of rights to appeal in the majority of
these cases has been a writ of coram nobis and a hearing to determine the validity
of the defendant's claim.2 6 Once the validity of the claim is established, the right
to appeal is simply considered as reinstated,2 7 or the court may impose a new
sentence nunc pro tunc so that the appeal period runs anew.28 This is an expan-
sion of the use of the writ coram nobis which ordinarily is used to bring to the
attention of the trial court matters occuring during the trial, but the Court of
Appeals has stated that it would not hesitate to expand the scope of the writ
when necessary to afford a deserving defendant a remedy in those cases in which
no other avenue of judicial relief appeared available.
29
Joseph S. Forma
ARREST FOR MISDEMEANOR NOT COMM.ITTED IN PRESENCE OF OFFICER NOT
SUPPORTABLE BY EVIDENCE SEIZED INCIDENT THKERETO
In one opinion the Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of six defend-
ants arrested without warrants on charges of book-making. Defendants Caliente
and Sessa were arrested after police officers observed them exchanging money
and slips of paper with various people. Search incident to the arrest produced
betting slips. Two other defendants, Cognetta and Grecco were arrested by police
officers who entered a store through a transom after hearing telephone conver-
sations indicating that bets were being received on horseraces and football games.
Defendants Perlman and Bernstein were arrested by a police officer who had
placed bets by telephone with individuals then unknown to him. After thus
registering the bets, the officer proceeded to nearby premises and stationed him-
self outside of the room in which was located the telephone he had called. Peering
through a mail slot the officer saw the defendants recording bets received by
26. See e.g., People v. Stanley, 12 N.Y.2d 250, 189 N.E.2d 478, 238 N.Y.S.2d 935
(1963); People v. Hill, 8 N.Y.2d 935, 168 N.E.2d 841, 204 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1960); People v.
Coe, 16 A.D.2d 876, 228 N.Y.S.2d 249 (4th Dep't 1962).
27. People v. Hill, supra note 26.
28. People v. Hairston, 10 N.Y.2d 92, 176 N.E.2d 90, 217 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1961).
29. Ibid.
1. The convictions were under § 986-b of the Penal Law. N.Y. Penal Law § 986 pro-
vides: "Any person who engages in . .. book-making with or without writing at any time
or place; or any person who keeps or occupies any room ...upon any public or private
grounds within this state . . . for the purpose of recording or registering bets or
wagers ...and any person who records or registers bets or wagers .. .upon the results
of any trial or contest of skill, speed, or power of endurance of man or beast . . . or
any person who receives, registers or records .. . any money, thing or consideration of
value, bet or wagered, or offered for the purpose of being bet or wagered, by or for any
other person . .. is guilty of a misdemeanor. . . " N.Y. Penal Law § 986-b provides:
"Any person other than a peace officer in the performance of his duty as such, who
knowingly have possession of any writing, paper or document representing or being a record,
made by a person engaged in book-making . . . of a bet or waget upon the results
of any trials or contests . .. shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Proof of the possession
of any writing .. . of the kind mentioned herein is presumptive evidence of possession
thereof knowingly."
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telephone calls. He entered the room with a pass key, and without a warrant
arrested the defendants. Upon appeal the defendants urged that the convictions
sustained at trial and affirmed by Appellate Part of the Court of Special Sessions
of the City of New York must be reversed as their constitutional rights under
the Fourth Amendment had been violated by the arresting officer's alleged illegal
search and seizure, and the introduction against them of the evidence so obtained.
On appeal, held, that the arrests were illegal since no misdemeanor had taken
place in the officer's presence, and evidence gained by a search incident to an
illegal arrest is inadmissible in the state courts. People v. Caliente, 12 N.Y.2d
89, 184 N.E.2d 550, 236 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1962).
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibits
"unreasonable searches" of person and property. However, the Constitution does
not specifically say anything about the exclusion or admission of evidence which
is obtained by means of unreasonable search or arrest. In 1884 the United States
Supreme Court decided the case of Boyd v. United States2 and although not
concerned with the problem of search and seizure, the first awareness of the
evidentiary rules implicit in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments came to light.
Thirty years later this Court directly met the same issue of the propriety of the
use of unconstitutionally seized evidence in Federal prosecution and held in Weeks
v. United States3 that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in Federal
Courts was inherent in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. The Court later indicated that the exclusionary rule of the Weeks
case could be forced upon the state courts by means of the Due Process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 4 However, the majority
reasoned that it was more expedient to let the states decide for themselves, and,
as long as steps were taken to uphold the Fourth Amendment, no federal inter-
ference by way of the exclusionary rule should issue from them. At this time
thirty states rejected the doctrine on various grounds. In 1955, in an opinion by
Justice Traynor 5 the State of California accepted on its own volition the doctrine
of the Weeks case and reasoned with considerable foresight what the Supreme
Court of the U.S. was to say in 1961 when deciding Mapp v. Ohio.0 The Cali-
fornia court considered that the only practical way to give substance to the
Fourth Amendment was by applying the exclusionary rule to the state courts.
At this time New York State still refused to accept the exclusionary doctrine.
In People v. Defore,7 decided in 1926, Judge Cardozo argued that with authority
divided on the issue the courts should not change their approach until the legis-
lature acted. That decision was based upon the Supreme Court's upholding of
People v. Adamss in 1916 and saying that such a decision struck the balance
2. 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
5. People v. Caban, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
6. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7. 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
8. 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636 (1903).
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between protecting society from crime and safeguarding individual liberties. At
the time of the decision in Dejore the Supreme Court had changed its views as
to the admissibility of illegally seized evidence,9 but New York nevertheless,
permitted introduction of such evidence. The search in the Dejore case was a
violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure incorporated
in the New York Constitution.'0 In 1943, in People v. Richter's Jewelers Inc."
the Court of Appeals allowed the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence,
verifying the New York court's opinion on this matter. The fluctuations between
the state courts in this regard came to an end in 1961 when the Supreme Court
applied the exclusionary rule of the Weeks case to the state courts in the cele-
brated case of Mapp v. Ohio. The Court said that the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution through its Due Process clause against the
states, binds the courts of the states to. exclude all unconstitutional 'evidence
obtained as a result of an "unreasonable" search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution contains the very important
term "probable cause." This term is decisive in any felony arrest made without
a warrant and is a deciding factor as to whether or not a warrant will issue by a
magistrate or judge. The terms probable cause, reasonable grounds, or reasonable
cause all mean essentially the same thing.'2 The prohibition in the New York and
United States Constitutions is against an "unreasonable search"; a search which
has no probable cause is unreasonable and cannot become legal by what is un-
covered in the search.' 3 The United States Constitution dictates that all searches
made without warrant are unreasonable. The exceptions to this rule are the
necessary ones of a search by consent 14 or as incidental to a lawful arrest.15 A
search incidental to a lawful arrest will be reasonable or unreasonable depending
upon whether there was probable cause. At common law a police officer had the
authority to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor if it involved a breach
of the peace and was committed in his presence. 6 These powers were broadened
by the adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1881 by giving a police
officer the authority to make an arrest without a warrant for any crime committed
in his presence.1 7 However, the distinction between "committed in officer's
9. Angenello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
10. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12.
11. 291 N.Y. 161, 51 N.E.2d 690 (1943).
12. Burt v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 1, 73 N.E. 495 (1905); Peers v. New York, 6 Misc.
2d 779, 165 N.YS.2d 171 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
13. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Lee v. United States, 232 F.2d
354 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Walker v. United States, 125 F.2d 395 (Sth Cir. 1942); Bell v.
United States, 9 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1925).
14. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
15. People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1961).
16. See Hall, Legal & Social Aspects of Arrest Without Warrant, 49 Harv. L. Rev.
566 (1936).
17. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 177; People v. Moore, 11 N.Y.2d 271, 183 N.E.2d
225, 228 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1962); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
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presence" for making an arrest for a misdemeanor must be contrasted with the
"reasonable cause" limitation placed upon arrest for a felony.18 Many states
allow an officer to make an arrest without a warrant if he had reasonable grounds
for believing that a misdemeanor is being committed in his presence.19
In the instant case the court concluded that, since the crimes were misde-
meanors which the officers did not know had taken place in their presence, the
arrests were illegal, and, consequently, the evidence was obtained by means of
an unconstitutional search, and must be suppressed in accordance with the
decision in Mapp v. Ohio. In the Caliente and Sessa cases the court reasoned that
there is no crime inherent in exchanging slips of paper and money. The only
proof of a crime was the slips illegally seized after the arrest. Thus the court
found that the officers arrested on probable cause that a misdemeanor was being
committed and such an arrest is prohibited by section 177 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. 20 In the Perlman and Cognetto cases the officers had re-
spectively placed bets over the telephone and heard bets being made by phone.
The dissent2 ' reasoned such circumstances show that a misdemeanor was taking
place and since the officers were a party to the crime (in the Perlman case) and
heard the completion of the crime (in the Cognetto case) the misdemeanor had
taken place in the officers' presence. However, this position is untenable as the
officers did not know who committed the crime until they entered the premises
-and an entry under such circumstances is a tresspass rendering the ensuing
arrests unlawful. The officers could not enter the premises without a valid rea-
son.22 The mere hearing of a conversation from beyond closed doors indicating
that a misdemeanor was being committed was not the commission of such in the
officers' presence. Consequently it appears that the officers entered only upon
probable cause that a misdemeanor was being committed and this basis fails to
meet the statutory test for a lawful arrest for misdemeanor without a warrant.
The majority's decision indicates that the statutory requirement of "in the
officer's presence" means more than mere physical proximity. As pointed out in
18. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 177(4),(5); People v. Massey, 6 N.Y.2d 893, 160
N.E.2d 922, 190 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1959).
19. Hill v. Day, 168 Kan. 604, 215 P.2d 219 (1950); Ryan v. Conover, 59 Ohio App.
361, 18 N.E.2d 277 (Ct. App. Hamilton County 1938); Cave v. Cooley, 48 N.M. 478,
152 P.2d 886 (1944); State ex rel. Verdis v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 120 W. Va. 593, 199 S.E.
884 (1938).
20. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 177 provided at that time:
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person, (1) For a crime, committed
or attempted in his presence; (2) When the person arrested has committed a
felony, although not in his presence; (3) When a felony has in fact been com-
mitted and he has reasonable grounds for believing the person to be arrested has
committed it....
The "presence" limitation in a misdemeanor is to be contrasted with the "reasonable
ground" factor in a felony arrest.
21. Instant case at 96, 184 N.E.2d at 553, 236 N.Y.S.2d at 949, also raised the question
of whether defendants Perlman and Bernstein had standing to entitle them to Constitu-
tional protection since the title to the premises was in someone else's name. For an ex-
tensive treatment of this issue, see Brief for Appellant pp. 16-22.
22. Accord, Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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Caliente and Sessa the officer must know that the acts which he is observing are
criminal in themselves. A further requirement is that the officer must know at
least the physical identity of the individual who is committing the misdemeanor.
Thus it appears that in order for an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor
to be lawful the officer must have enough evidence to convict a given individual
at the time of the arrest.
This decision is indicative of the responsibility which the courts of the
United States have assumed in order to safeguard the Constitutional rights of
the individual. The officers arrested merely on probable cause that a misdemeanor
was being committed in the Caliente and Sessa cases and on probable cause that
the individuals whom they arrested in the Perlman and Cognetto cases were
those who had committed the misdemeanors. Therefore the Court's position is
altogether justified in light of the statutory provision in force at the time of
deciding the present case and the Mapp decision. Three weeks after this case
the Court of Appeals decided People v. De Leo.23 An officer observed a man
entering a vacant building. The officer then climbed to the roof; from here he
saw and heard the defendants engaging in book-making activities. The officer
entered and arrested the defendants. In an ensuing search betting slips were
found. The Court upheld the convictions without an opinion. This case appears
to be in harmony with the instant case since the officer had positive identification
of the individuals who had committed a misdemeanor in his presence. The prob-
lem of sustaining convictions in this area does not stem so much from the Mapp
decision as it does from the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, prior to Mapp
the Code was not as restrictive since evidence obtained illegally was admissible
in the state courts. Recognizing the difficulties which the law enforcement agen-
cies have had in this area and appreciating the social necessity of rendering the
law enforceable, the New York State Legslature has passed two bills, effective
July 1, 1963 which should ease the police officer's dilemma while maintaining
Constitutional rights. The Wallach bill2 4 amends subdivision 1 of section 177
of the Code of Criminal Procedure so that a police officer, "as enumerated in
section one hundred fifty-four (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure," will be
permitted to make a misdemeanor arrest without a warrant when he has "reason-
able grounds for believing" that a crime is being committed in his presence.
Before the amendment a peace officer could make such an arrest without a
warrant only when the crime was committed or attempted in his presence.25 The
Rules Committee Bill2 6 amends the Code of Criminal Procedure by adding a
new section, 154-a, which gives a broader definition to the term police officer in
relation to peace officers. With the above changes in effect, the law enforcement
agencies will be better equipped to enforce the statutes prohibiting betting and
23. 12 N.Y.2d 913, 188 N.E.2d 402, 238 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1963).
24. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 580, § 1(1).
25. See Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925); Steele v. United States, 267
U.S. 498 (1925) ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
26. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 581, § 154(a).
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also the use of narcotics. 27 The decision in the present case would no doubt be
reversed if arising under the present statute and once again the proper balance
between the Constitutional rights of the individual and the protection of society
against such crimes should be realized.
Douglas P. Grawunder
CONVICTION OF AGENT OF OWNER FOR VIOLATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
WHICH REFERRED TO OWNERS UPHELD
Defendant, as agent in charge of a multiple dwelling in Manhattan, was
convicted of violating a provision of the Administrative Code of the City of
New York requiring that every owner of a multiple dwelling file a statement
of registration and occupancy. That conviction before the Magistrates Court
of the City of New York was reversed and the complaint dismissed by order
of the Appellate Part of the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York,
on the ground that the registration requirement imposed by the Administrative
Code pertains to true owners only, and therefore did not cover defendant. On
appeal by permission, held, reversed, three judges dissenting. The Administrative
Code provision requiring that owners of multiple dwellings file a statement of
registration and occupancy, does not apply to true owners only, but also applies
to agents and any responsible person in charge of the premises. People v.
Chodorov, 12 N.Y.2d 176, 188 N.E.2d 124, 237 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1962).
The Council of the City of New York enacted Title D of the Multiple
Dwelling Code1 in 1955 as an integrated plan for coping with conditions of
(Covercrowding, excessive occupancy, insufficient sanitation" and other health
hazards plaguing the tenement housing of the city.2 The Council found that the
enforcement of multiple dwelling regulations in the past had been severely,
handicapped by difficulty in identifying, and the unavailability of the persons
responsible for the proper maintenance of the buildings within the city.3 In
order to cure this problem section D26-3.1 was passed. The Council sought, by
requiring the registration of multiple dwellings and the designation of a person
responsible therefor, to eliminate the obstructions of unavailability and lack of
identification. Such a law is entirely within the legislative power of the Council4
as set forth in the Constitution,5 the New York City Charter, and those pro-
visions of the Multiple Dwelling Law which permit cities to promulgate more
27. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Blackford v. United States,
247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957); People v. Sullivan, 18 A.D.2d 1066, 239 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1st
Dep't 1963) (per curiam); People v. Diaz, 36 Misc. 2d 195, 232 N.Y.S.2d 208 (N.Y.C. Ct.
of Spec. Sess. 1962) ; People v. Ibarra, 30 Cal. Rptr. 223 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
1. New York City Administrative Code §§ D26-1.0 to -8.0 (1955).
2. New York City Administrative Code § D26-1.0 (1955).
3. Ibid.
4. People v. Schildhaus, 17 Misc. 2d 825, 186 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1959),
accord, People v. Lewis, 295 N.Y. 42, 64 N.E.2d 702 (1945).
5. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 12.
6. New York City Charter § 27.
